Paradoxes

A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Many paradoxes raise serious philosophical problems, and they are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. The expanded and revised third edition of this intriguing book considers a range of knotty paradoxes including Zenos paradoxical claim that the runner can never overtake the tortoise, a new chapter on paradoxes about morals, paradoxes about belief, and hardest of all, paradoxes about truth. The discussion uses a minimum of technicality but also grapples with complicated and difficult considerations, and is accompanied by helpful questions designed to engage the reader with the arguments. The result is not only an explanation of paradoxes but also an excellent introduction to philosophical thinking. Contents
Foreword to third edition
Introduction
Suggested reading
1. Zenos paradoxes: space, time, and motion
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Space
1.3 The Racetrack
1.4 The Racetrack again
1.5 Achilles and the Tortoise
1.6 The Arrow
Suggested reading
2. Moral paradoxes
2.1 Crime reduction
2.2 Mixed blessings
2.3 Not being sorry
2.4 Moral dilemmas
Suggested reading
3. Vagueness: the paradox of the heap
3.1 Sorites paradoxes: preliminaries
3.2 Sorites paradoxes: some options
3.3 Accepting the conclusion: Ungers view
3.4 Rejecting the premises: the epistemic theory
3.5 Rejecting the premises: supervaluations
3.6 Rejecting the reasoning: degrees of truth
3.7 Vague objects?
Suggested reading
4. Acting rationally
4.1 Newcombs paradox
4.2 The Prisoners Dilemma
Suggested reading
5. Believing rationally
5.1 Paradoxes of confirmation
5.1.1 Background
5.1.2 The paradox of the Ravens
5.1.3 Grue
5.2 The Unexpected Examination
5.3 Revising the Unexpected Examination
5.4 The Knower
Suggested reading
6. Classes and truth
6.1 Russells paradox
6.2 The Liar: semantic defects
6.3 Grounding and truth
6.4 The Strengthened Liar
6.5 Levels
6.6 Self-reference
6.7 Indexicality
6.8 Indexical circularity
6.9 Comparison: how similar are Russells paradox and the Liar?
Suggested reading
7. Are any contradictions acceptable?
7.1 Contradictions entail everything
7.2 A sentence which is both true and false could have no intelligible content
7.3 Three dualities
7.4 Negation
7.5 Falsehood and untruth
Suggested reading
Appendix I: Some more paradoxes
Appendix II: Remarks on some text questions and appended paradoxes
Bibliography
Index.

Author/Editor Details
R. M. Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin